Clean Up Your Act
After 10 years ofrulings restricting citizen-suit enforcement of environmental laws, the U.S. Supreme Court may be set to force plaintiff groups to pick their cases wisely.
BY ALAN M. RAMO
The original idea behind the citizen-suit concept, found in the federal Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Community Right to Know Act and others, was to supplement environmental law enforcement and to save taxpayer money while holding polluters and government regulators accountable.
Defendants frequently claim that citizen suits are disruptive to orderly enforcement because they upset carefully worked out arrangements with environmental agencies. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better ElIvironment-California v. Union Oil Co. of California, 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996 . Polluters say that enforcement efforts are nothing more than extortion or payoffs to plaintiffs seeking fees and contributions for their allied envi~ ronmental groups.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled, however, that such settlements are proper if they achieve the governing act's purposes by protecting the ecosystem the defendant allegedly harmed. Sierra Club Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design !tIC., 909 F .2d 1350 (9th Cir.1990 .
In spite of congressional approval of citizen suits and a lengthy record of achievements measured by penalties and pollution abatement, the U.S. Supreme Court has led the charge to curtail citizen-suit filings. Initially, the Supreme Court turned what had been a pre-litigation notice -the 50-called 6O-day notice of intent to sueinto a formal "mandatory condition precedent for suit"
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. 8,· ,October 15. ,1999", V.EIilQICT/i,& SEn~E.M,E:r~TS ing the defendant had violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because of the failure to send the notice to state and federal environmental authorities in addition to the defendant, as mandated by the act's 6O-day notice provisions.
The Hallstrom ruling reverberated in lower courts. In Washington Trout v. McCain Foods Inc., 45F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1994 . the 9th Circuit held that even though a notice was timely filed, its failure to include two additional plaintiffs rendered it fatally defective and deprived plaintiffs of jurisdiction. The 9th Circuit later ruled in another case that a 6O-day notice sent to the proper persons in a timely manner with the proper plaintiffs was still insufficient, because it was not detailed enough to alert the parties to the substance of the lawsuit Southwest Ctr. 871 (1990) , the plaintiffs argued that the Bureau of Land Management violated various environmental laws when making a broad programmatic decision to reclassify various lands so that they could be subject to mining.
In a 54 decision, the court held that the plaintiffs' failure to visit one piece of land among those reclassified meant they did not have standing to sue over the entire reclassification, as their standing was limited only to decisions about individual parcels where they had some ongoing physical contact Two years later, in Lujan v. Ddenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the court further chipped away at the notion of injury. While a plaintiff's member had visited a site to see an endangered species -the Nile croco-dile at the Aswan Dam site in Egypt -the plaintiff could not prove the member would continue to visit the site. Thus, it would not be injured by the building , of the dam destroying the crocodile's habitat A concurring opinion stated that the decision might have been different-if plaintiffs members had plane tickets to visit the site again.
These cases presented barriers, but ones that a careful plaintiff anticipating the rules of standing and notice might still overcome. But they were only a prelude to the U.S. Supreme Court's most direct attack on citizen suits.'
In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118
S.Ct. 1003 (1998), Justice Antonin Scalia led the court in asserting a narrow interpretation of injury as a basis for stindini. In Steel Co., the plaintiffs had served' a 6(). day notice on a company that had failed to file its Community Right to Know Act reports of toxic chemicals used or discharged for a number of years. The company filed the reports after receiving the 6().day notice but before the lawsuit The court opined that there was no standing, reasoning that neither penalties, attorney fees nor even a claim for injunctive relief is sufficient. If a company comes into compliance, and there are no allegations indicating a continuing or imminent violation, then the company can presumably escape penalties, avoid an injunction and not pay the plaintiffs for their trouble in getting the violation remedied.
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